A Macro-Quantitative Analysis of Governance Performance by Lee, Melissa et al.
DFG Sonderforschungsbereich 700 Governance in Räumen begrenzter Staatlichkeit - Neue Formen des Regierens?
DFG Collaborative Research Center (SFB) 700 Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood - New Modes of Governance?
Melissa Lee, Gregor Walter-Drop, John Wiesel
SFB-Governance Working Paper Series • No. 45 • Mai 2016
The Pillars of Governance
 
A Macro-Quantitative Analysis of Governance Performance










SFB-Governance Working Paper Series
Edited by the Collaborative Research Center (SFB) 700 “Governance In Areas of Limited Statehood - New Modes of Governance?”
The SFB-Governance Working Paper Series serves to disseminate the research results of work in progress prior to publication 
to encourage the exchange of ideas and academic debate. Inclusion of a paper in the Working Paper Series should not limit 
publication in any other venue. Copyright remains with the authors.
Copyright for this issue: Melissa Lee, Gregor Walter-Drop, John Wiesel
Editorial assistance and production: Liisa Noack
All SFB-Governance Working Papers can be downloaded free of charge from www.sfb-governance.de/en/publikationen or 
ordered in print via e-mail to sfb700@zedat.fu-berlin.de.
Lee, Melissa/Walter-Drop, Gregor/Wiesel, John 2016: The Pillars of Governance. A Macro-Quantitative Analysis of Governance 
Performance, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 45, Collaborative Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, Mai 2016. 
ISSN 1864-1024 (Internet)
ISSN 1863-6896 (Print)
This publication has been funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG).
SFB-Governance Working Paper Series • No. 45 • Mai 2016 |  3
The Pillars of Governance. A Macro-Quantitative Analysis of Governance Performance 
Melissa Lee, Gregor Walter-Drop, John Wiesel
Abstract:
State building is seen as the central tenet of many present-day development efforts. This 
rests on a global normative script that emphasizes the modern state’s role in providing 
governance services from security to education to health. However, the relationship between 
statehood and governance outcomes is not well understood. We use a macro-quantitative 
approach to analyze state performance in various governance dimensions including security, 
health, education, economic subsistence, infrastructure, and the environment. We test for 
the power of statehood in explaining the variation in governance outcomes while controlling 
for various other factors prominent in the respective debates in political science, economics, 
and development studies. The analysis yields three interesting results. First, statehood does 
not have a consistent significant relationship with governance outcomes. It matters more for 
some outcomes than for others. Second, we find that statehood sometimes performs better 
at predicting subjective (survey-based) evaluations than at predicting objective measures of 
governance outcomes (which confirms the ubiquity of the normative script). Finally, we find 
that the degree of domestic female empowerment performs consistently strong at explaining 
the variation in governance outcomes. This result is consistent with the policy community’s 
emphasis on women’s roles in development.
Zusammenfassung:
“State-Building” wird vielerorts als Prinzip moderner Entwicklungspolitik angesehen. Dies 
beruht auf der Annahme, dass dem modernen Staat eine zentrale Rolle im Bereich der 
Gewährleistung von Governance-Dienstleistungen zukommt. Das Verhältnis zwischen 
Staatlichkeit und so verstandener „Governance“ ist jedoch alles andere als klar. Auf Basis 
eines makro-quantitativen Ansatzes, analysieren wir die Performanz von Staaten in Bereichen 
wie Sicherheit, Gesundheit, Bildung, ökonomische Subsistenz, Infrastruktur und Umwelt 
und fragen, inwieweit Staatlichkeit die entsprechenden Unterschiede erklären kann, wenn 
für diverse andere Faktoren kontrolliert wird, die in den entsprechenden Debatten (v.a. in 
der Politikwissenschaft und (Entwicklungs-) Ökonomie) als zentral angesehen werden. Drei 
Ergebnisse der Untersuchung stechen hervor: Erstens – und entgegen der obigen Annahme 
– lässt sich keine signifikante, konsistente Beziehung zwischen Staatlichkeit und objektiver 
Governance-Performanz herstellen. Zweitens schneiden die entsprechenden Indikatoren 
besser ab, wenn es um den Zusammenhang zur subjektiven Wahrnehmung von Governance-
Performanz geht, was die Ubiquität der o.g. Annahme bestätigt. Drittens schließlich stellt 
sich der Grad des „Empowerment“ von Frauen über ganz verschiedene Sachbereiche hinweg 
als stärkster Prädiktor der Governance-Performanz heraus. Dieses Ergebnis rechtfertigt den 
Schwerpunkt, den viele Akteure der Entwicklungspolitik derzeit auf die Förderung von Frauen 
legen.
The Pillars of Governance. A Macro-Quantitative Analysis of Governance Performance  |  4
Table of Content
1. Introduction 5
2. Statehood and Beyond: Explaining Governance Outcomes 8
2.1 The Dependent Variable: Governance Outcomes 8
2.2 The Independent Variables 9
3. The big picture: A global model of governance outcomes 18
4. A Closer View: The dimensions of Governance 21
4.1 Security Governance Outcomes 22
4.2 Economic Subsistence Outcomes 25
4.3 Public Health Governance Outcomes 29
4.4 Educational Governance Outcomes 33
4.5 Infrastructure Governance Outcomes 35
4.6 Environmental Governance Outcomes 37
5. Conclusions 39
References 41
SFB-Governance Working Paper Series • No. 45 • Mai 2016 |  5
1.  Introduction1
Policymakers, scholars, and citizens around the world care deeply about the quality of 
governance and the provision of collective goods and services. In developed countries, citizens 
take for granted that states supply these collective goods, whether through direct provision or 
through the promulgation of rules and regulations. In areas of limited statehood, however, the 
state lacks the capacity or incentive to provide these goods. Though many scholars have noted 
significant cross-variation in the provision of goods, we lack an understanding of the causes of 
that variation. The central question in this paper, therefore, is what explains the variation in the 
provision of governance and collective goods?
We approach this question from a macro-quantitative perspective. State-level macro-quantitative 
data on issues of governance and statehood are widely available and easily accessible. Various 
scientific and non-scientific institutions have established indicators, datasets, and rankings of 
the world’s states on a variety of dimensions. Prominent datasets include the UN Development 
Program’s Human Development Index (HDI), the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance 
Indicators, the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI), and Polity IV (Marshall et al. 2010), 
among others. The respective data and rankings are ubiquitous, not only in scientific footnotes, 
but also in political discourse where arguments based on such data can translate into tangible 
policy successes. Two key factors drive the popularity and proliferation of quantitative data. On 
the one hand, for many, “hard data” has the air of the “scientific evidence” – probably more so 
than other forms of research results because of the ease of comparison across different cases. 
On the other hand, state-level macro-quantitative data seem very useful in that they appear to 
give order to the otherwise highly complex reality of world politics. We take advantage of the 
proliferation of cross-national macro-quantitative data to explore the correlates of governance 
and the provision of collective goods in a comprehensive analysis based on a thorough screening 
and evaluation of the existing datasets. However, we approach this analysis in a way that (1) 
significantly differs from many popular approaches; and that (2) is well aware of its limitations.
The first way our approach differs from many others is that it is based on a clear conceptual 
differentiation between governance on the one hand and statehood on the other: in order to be 
able to analyze the relationship between the two. In many existing datasets (especially complex 
indices compiled from a high number of indicators), elements of statehood and elements of 
governance are merged into one index and sometimes even into one indicator. For instance, 
the World Bank’s “government effectiveness” indicator combines several dozen indicators 
(Kaufmann et al. 2009: 177). Among those, we distinguish between at least two different types 
of indicators: First, indicators that aim to measure the attributes of the state, as in a state’s 
ability to implement rules such as the Political Risk Services’ (PRS) “Bureaucracy Quality”, or the 
1 This paper is the result of almost one year of data collection, data compilation and data analysis. 
The authors would like to thank all the student assistants involved in this endeavor, in particular 
Eric Stollenwerk, Franziska Strack, Stefanie Renatus, Heiko Bölk, Xaver Keller, and Santiago Gonzales. 
In addition, we would like to thank Cord Schmelzle, Zeljko Branovic, Ursula Schröder and Julian 
Schumacher for their helpful comments and input!
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Economist Intelligence Unit’s “Quality of Bureaucracy” indicator; and second, indicators that 
measure (perceived) governance outcomes (the World Competitiveness Yearbook’s “bureaucracy 
hinders business activity” question, or Gallup World Poll’s (GWP) “satisfaction with education 
system” survey). 
We understand statehood as domestic sovereignty in Krasner’s (1999) sense: as (monopoly) 
control over the use of legitimate force and effective administrative capacity, where 
administrative capacity is the ability to pass, implement, and enforce regulations. Governance, 
on the other hand, refers to all methods of social coordination “to produce and implement 
collectively binding rules or to provide collective goods” (Risse 2011). For the purposes of the 
following paper, we are particularly interested in the collective goods aspect of governance or 
the provision of services and the respective policy outcomes. Note that this conceptualization 
implies that such goods can be provided by the state but do not have to be.
Based on this concept, our central question is how the variance in governance outcomes across 
states can be explained using statehood as one potential independent variable. As noted above, 
our conceptualization allows us to see statehood as one of a number of predictors of governance 
outcomes. Following this line of thinking, we present a number of multivariate analyses of 
governance where statehood represents only one independent variable among others drawn 
mainly from the literature on governance and on development. 
Our conceptual and empirical approach differs from other approaches in some additional 
respects. Most significant are the principles of (secondary) data collection. As we have noted, 
aggregate indices very often confound statehood and governance as conceptualized above. In 
addition, macro-indices often overlap with regard to their individual indicators, rendering the 
results of any causal analysis largely invalid. For instance, both Transparency International’s 
Corruptions Perceptions Index (Transparency International 2010) and the World Bank’s 
Control of Corruption indicator  (Kaufmann 2009: 79) are aggregates of corruption measures 
and ratings from the Economist Intelligence Unit, the Global Insight Business Conditions and 
Risk Indicators, and the World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Survey, among others. 
By contrast, we only use fully disaggregated individual indicators. 
In addition, we only use datasets of (in principle) global geographic scope. For the purposes 
of specific analyses, a significant amount of data are available for a subset of the world’s states, 
such as the member states of EU, OECD, or conversely, for what the Bertelsmann Foundation 
calls “transformation countries” (the non-OECD world). In order to maximize the reach of our 
analysis, we only use sources which – at least in principle – are based on global coverage and 
collected with comparable standards worldwide. 
The second way our analysis differs from existing approaches is that despite our efforts in 
data screening and cleaning, we remain conscious of the limits of any macro-quantitative 
approach, especially one that relies on cross-sectional regressions. Most significantly, state-level 
data can never take into account sub-national variation such as regional differences. Consider, 
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for instance, Somalia, often depicted as one of the starkest cases for deficits in statehood. Yet 
even superficial research yields that there are tremendous differences in the monopoly of force 
between, say, Mogadishu and Somaliland, an internationally non-recognized entity exhibiting 
almost all characteristics of statehood in our sense. This is also true for the governance side, 
where it is clear that in many countries governance outcomes vary significantly between urban 
and rural areas. State-level data is thus by definition prone to methodological nationalism. 
In addition, state-level data appears to treat all states equal with respect to the quality of data 
collection. Yet the quality and reliability of that data varies tremendously from country to 
country – not least because of variations in statehood and in the capacities of the statistics 
bureaus, a particularly thorny problem whenever state sources are used. 
Finally, existing datasets often tend to incorporate data collected at various points in time 
in an effort to maximize the number of observations. This tendency makes the analysis of 
chronologically unidirectional causal relationships difficult.2 The absence of long time-series 
for most governance indicators also makes it impossible to draw causal inferences. At best, we 
can only point to relationships and speculate on the causal pathways linking our explanatory 
variables to our dependent variables.
These caveats should caution us in our claims. However, we think that our analyses still yield 
some remarkable insights which – given the above considerations – deserve exploration 
in further research. First and most interestingly, statehood is a remarkably bad predictor 
of governance outcomes. This result is rather surprising given the prevalence that the state 
maintains in the dominant discourse on governance. This is particularly true for the policy-
discourse which tends to see the establishment or improvement of statehood as the single most 
important measure to improve governance outcomes. Second, we can show that by and large 
in a significant number of issue areas the variation in governance outcomes can be explained 
quite well with macro-quantitative data – albeit not with statehood. Third, the most surprising 
independent variable in this regard is our (rather conservative) measure for the empowerment 
of women in society. Its relationship to governance outcomes is highly significant, strong, and 
positive across a variety of issue areas. This finding is reminiscent of the increasing attention 
that is given to the “gender gap” or “female empowerment,” especially in the development 
(policy) literature (Abu-Ghaida and Klasen 2004; Sen 1990), but the robustness of the finding 
across issue areas from education to economic subsistence remains rather remarkable. Fourth, 
economic equality also plays an unexpectedly strong role in four out of the six dimensions of 
governance we examined.
This paper proceeds as follows. We first introduce our model and its variables (section 2), 
and then present aggregate results (section 3). Subsequently, we disaggregate governance into 
2 In order to tackle this problem, we aimed at compiling data for 2008 as our ’standard’ year of 
measurement. For the governance dimensions and alternative explanations we calculated the average 
value of all indicators for the years 2007-2011 and included the mean value in our regressions.
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six different dimensions and present multivariate regression results (section 4) before we 
summarize our approach and our results in the conclusion (section 5).
2. Statehood and Beyond: Explaining Governance Outcomes
2.1 The Dependent Variable: Governance Outcomes
As a topic of scholarly interest, governance has moved to the forefront of social science research. 
A simple JSTOR search yields more than 3,200 scholarly articles on governance in journals from 
political science, public policy, and sociology – all published in the last five years. Yet despite 
– or perhaps because of this surge in interest – the contours of the topic are still soft and 
poorly defined. Governance is often confounded with government, which is also sometimes 
conflated with statehood. We conceive of governance as conceptually independent of the 
state, allowing for an analysis of the relationship between the two. We define governance as 
institutionalized modes of social coordination that aim to produce and implement binding 
rules or provide collective goods (Risse 2011). Such collective goods include security, economic 
welfare, education, public health, sustainable infrastructure, and a clean and safe environment. 
For the purposes of this paper, we are focusing on the outcomes of governance, the tangible results 
of the above-mentioned institutions of social coordination. In other words, we want to explain 
the variation in outcomes in the issue areas of security, economic welfare, education, health, 
infrastructure, and environmental degradation. Wherever possible, we tried to analyze both 
objective and subjective measures of governance performance. For example, we contrasted data 
on objective public health outcomes with survey-based citizen perceptions of public health.
Note that the way in which we are studying governance outcomes significantly overlaps with 
prominent variables in development studies and development economics, which also look at 
issues such as health, education, and poverty. We are, however, not interested in issues such 
as economic growth; and some issues discussed in development studies (such as equality or 
income), we consider as independent variables rather than as dependent variables. Still, we are 
well aware that a significant part of the development literature is relevant for our undertaking 
and in fact we have taken most of the cues for our independent variables from this very literature.
In order to arrive at an overall picture of governance outcomes (see section 3), we aggregate 
across the individual dimensions introduced above. The bulk of the multivariate analysis below 
is carried out on the level of the individual governance dimension (see section 4). For the sake of 
brevity, we will introduce the conceptualization and the operationalization of the six individual 
dimensions of governance in detail below. At this point, it is sufficient to mention that for each 
of the above mentioned dimensions we have identified rather conservative primary indicators 
that we believe to be largely politically uncontroversial. Regardless of ideological or cultural 
background, e.g. most observers would agree that the minimization of child mortality is 
a meaningful goal of health governance. We chose indicators for the other dimensions in a 
similar fashion.
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In sum, our model is intended to explain the differences in the achievement of such rather 
uncontroversial goals of governance in security, economic welfare, education, health, 
infrastructure, and environmental degradation on the state-level. 
2.2 The Independent Variables
Following our conceptual distinction introduced above, we use statehood as our primary 
independent variable for explaining governance. In this section we also discuss our alternate 
independent variables drawn from the literature on governance and development. A 
fundamental methodological problem for any quantitative analysis lies in the fact that many 
common explanatory variables are closely interrelated. We have thus ordered and clustered the 
variables in a total of five different causal pathways that represent clearly distinguishable causal 
links between the respective variables and governance outcomes. In the remainder of this 
section, we introduce each of these pathways and variables, link them to the relevant literature, 
and discuss the prevalent associated hypotheses. Note that at this point we do not argue in favor 
or against any of them. We merely introduce the most common claims that are to be evaluated 
in the subsequent analysis.
Explanatory Pathway 1: Statehood
Given the nature of the dominant discussion on governance, statehood is the natural candidate 
for the most important factor explaining the variation in the governance outcomes. In fact, the 
development of these governance goals can and has been written as the development of the 
modern Western state. Internal and external security was the very raison d’être at the time of the 
emergence of modern states in the 16th and 17th centuries (Tilly 1992). Building infrastructure 
is also a relatively early goal of state activity, first in the service of security and later for the 
purpose of fostering economic development. Providing education and public health arrive 
relatively late as goals of state activity and environmental issues have only recently entered the 
agenda. However, the different historical pathways notwithstanding, it seems fair to assume 
that today “Western” citizens expect their respective states to deliver in all these fields. 
It is therefore not surprising that many contributions to (Northern) governance research take 
certain core elements of modern statehood for granted. These elements usually include the 
monopoly over the use of legitimate force and the fundamental ability to pass, implement, 
and enforce political decisions, both of which are at the core of what Krasner (1999) has called 
“domestic sovereignty”. Often overlooked is the fact that, outside the OECD, these assumptions 
do not hold (see the introductory chapter to this volume). In fact, seen in a broader context, 
Western-style consolidated statehood is both an historical and contemporary exception. Even 
today, in most developing or transition countries (encompassing more than three quarters of 
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the world’s population), state or government control over the use of force is at best tenuous and 
incomplete, and so is the ability to implement and enforce policy or regulation. 
To be sure, even within the West we might find pockets of limited statehood (such as police no-
go areas in American inner cities) and implementation problems might even be considered a 
universal condition. But statehood is best conceived of as a continuous variable, ranging from 
the Nordic countries to Russia and Colombia all the way to Sudan, Somalia, and Afghanistan. 
The corresponding hypothesis is that the greater degree of statehood, the higher the achievements 
in the fundamental goals of governance. The above (somewhat stereotypical) examples seem to 
confirm this idea.
In order to test this line of reasoning we use a total of three variables that are closely linked 
to our definition of statehood. One variable covers the monopoly of force (MoF) whereas two 
others capture the capacity of the state to implement and enforce rules and regulation.
IV1: Monopoly of Force : 
For the variable Monopoly of Force, we use a combination of two indicators from the Political 
Instability Task Force’s (PITF) dataset. MAGFAIL captures situations “in which the institutions 
of the central state are so weakened that they can no longer maintain authority or political order 
in significant parts of the country” (Marshall et al. 2010). MAGAREA measures the proportion 
of a country “affected by fighting or revolutionary protest” (Marshall et al. 2010). Our variable 
combines these two indicators in order to capture the relative strength of state institutions (vis-
à-vis its challengers) and territorial reach of both state institutions and the MoF.3 
IV2: Bureaucratic Capacity (BC): 
Various measures of state capacity or statehood focus on the functioning of a state’s bureaucracy. 
Often, these measures implicitly or explicitly follow Max Weber’s notion of the central role that 
an impersonal, rule-oriented, professional bureaucracy plays in modern states as compared to 
earlier forms of traditional or charismatic rule (Weber 1921/1980). Conceptually, Weber’s idea 
comes very close to our notion of implementation capacity. Empirically, a factor analysis of a 
wide range of available measures of capacity has demonstrated that bureaucratic quality exhibits 
the highest loading of any of the included factors, which suggests that administrative capacity 
dominates researchers’ understandings of state capacity (Hanson/Sigman 2011). A well-regarded 
and widely-used bureaucratic quality indicator is from the PRS’ International Risk Country 
Guide (ICRG). However, a significant drawback of all ICRG measures is the fact that PRS does 
not release the codebook, so the details of the coding procedure remain obscure. However, 
3 For a similar measure combining MAGFAIL and MAGAREA see Branovic, Zeljko (2011): The 
Privatisation of Security in Failing States: A Quantitative Assessment, DCAF Occasional Papers, 24, 
Geneva.and Goldstone, Jack  A./ Bates, Robert H./ Epstein, David L./Ted, Robert G./ Lustik, Michael B./ 
Marshall, Monty G./ Ulfelder, Jay and Woodward, Mark (2010): A Global Model for Forecasting Political 
Instability, in: American Journal of Political Science, 54, 190-208.
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the ICRG’s bureaucratic quality measure shows rankings very similar to the “administrative 
capacity” indictor from the BTI, which does provide public codebook information. The BTI 
measure seems valid given our conceptualization but covers only countries Bertelsmann 
considers to be “transformation countries” (the non-OECD world). Given the similar results 
and the greater geographic reach, we prefer the ICRG indicator.
IV3: Enforcement Capability (EC): 
Enforcement is the most difficult of the elements of our statehood definition to measure. 
Conceptually, enforcement refers to the state’s ability to use hierarchical means to ensure that 
rules and regulations are being followed. This is much less about an “iron fist” of coercive force 
(only present in the more extreme cases), but more about an effective legal system (ultimately 
backed up by the threat of the use of force). Reliable measures for a functioning legal system, 
however, are rather scarce and the most ambitious of these, the World Justice Project’s “Rule of 
Law Index”, only covers some 66 countries – as of their 2011 data release (Agrast et al. 2011). 
We thus use an indirect measure that captures access to the legal system (and its efficiency) 
by looking at the overall costs that a plaintiff has to advance when settling a standardized 
commercial legal claim relative to income per capita. We use the World Bank’s cost of claim 
indicator from the “Doing Business – Enforcing Contracts” dataset that covers court costs, 
enforcement costs, and average attorney fees as a percentage of a financial claim, equivalent 
to 200% of annual income per capita in the respective country (World Bank 2011)  – Bribes are 
excluded. As this indicator approaches (or even exceeds) 1 (or rather: 100%) it seems safe to 
assume that legal rule enforcement becomes more and more difficult.
Explanatory Pathway 2: Economic Capacity and Equality
When considering the determinants of governance outcomes, it seems an obvious conclusion 
that the overall economic capacity of any given country should play a decisive role (Huther/Shah 
1998; Stiglitz et al. 2009). Most readers would probably agree with the corresponding hypothesis 
that the higher the economic capacity of any given state, the better the governance outcomes. The higher 
the economic development of a state, the better economic wellbeing, health, and education of its 
citizens, the better its infrastructure, and the better even its security situation may be. However, 
there is also a vibrant discussion about the effects of economic equality independent from 
economic capacity. This debate does not concern all of the governance dimensions considered 
in this study but is relevant for security and public health. In the security sector, inequality may 
drive up crime (in particular, property crime, violent crime, and murder) because of perceived 
injustice and a rising relative deprivation in significant parts of the population (Jacobs/
Richardson, 2008; Kelly 2000). In the health sector, some authors have investigated the effects 
of inequality on life expectancy and infant mortality, arguing also on the basis of deprivation 
theory (Deaton 2003; Leigh/Jencks 2007; Lynch et al. 2004). Based on these considerations, we 
included two variables into our study to capture economic capacity and economic equality, 
respectively.
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IV4: Mean Income 
Gross domestic product per capita (GDPpc) is commonly used for measuring the overall 
economic capacity of any given country. For our purposes, however, the precise causal link 
between GDPpc and governance outcomes is not as clear as it might appear at first. While 
GDPpc might capture the economic capacity of a state relative to the size of its population, the 
implicit causal pathways to our governance outcomes depend on a number of assumptions that 
may or may not hold. Therefore, we prefer a measure closer to the causal pathways described 
above. Following our conceptualization which separates governance from statehood, we assume 
the existence of two central causal pathways, one via the state and one via its citizens. First, 
economic capacity might translate into state revenue and the state might use this revenue to 
ensure the provision of governance services. Second, economic capacity might also translate 
into private income that can be used to purchase governance services (such as education) in the 
private market, or to collectively organize and finance their provision (such as a neighborhood 
watch). We thus assume that government revenue and citizens’ income are measures which 
much better capture these causal pathways. GDPpc as a variable can be considered prior to 
both, but requires additional assumptions about the respective links. Empirically, worldwide 
measures for state revenue are scarce because of the inherent difficulties in comparing the 
internationally widely diverging taxation schemes, and because of poor reporting rates to 
international organizations that collect such information. In addition, the available and 
comparable data show an extremely high correlation between data on state revenue and data 
on private income. For the purposes of our regression analysis, the resulting multicollinearity 
would have forced us to choose between both measures, so we selected the indicator with the 
broader global coverage, which was citizens’ mean income. The indicator is based on OECD 
data on gender distribution and gender income (OECD Development Centre 2011).
IV5: Economic Equality
The most common indicator for (in)equality is the Gini coefficient. Gini is based on a Lorenz 
curve, which shows the proportion of total income that is cumulatively earned by the least 
well-off percentage of the population. The coefficient is a measure of the area under the Lorenz 
curve and ranges from 1 (perfect equality) to 0 (perfect inequality). High-quality worldwide Gini 
data is available from the UN University’s (UNU) World Income Inequality Database (WIID) 
(UNU-WIDER 2008). We supplement this data with World Bank data when no UNU data were 
available (World Bank, 2010).4 
Explanatory Pathway 3: Regime Type
The literature on regime type revolves around discussions of democracy, autocracy, elements 
of these respective regimes, and their consequences. The literature suggests three possible 
4 We manually substituted data for two additional data points using data from the CIA World Factbook, 
Central Intelligence Agency (2011): The World Factbook, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC..
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hypotheses about the relationship between regime type and collective goods. Some authors 
argue that, on balance, regime type has no major effect on governance, development, or 
growth (Glaeser et al 2004; Glaeser et al. 2006; Kurzman et al. 2002). Other scholars claim that 
autocracies, especially those with lower levels of development, perform better (particularly in 
fostering growth) because of more efficient rule-making systems (see e.g., O’Donnell 1999). 
However, a significant group of scholars argue that democracy improves the economic and social 
performance of states (see e.g., Franco et al. 2004; Halperin et al 2005; Iqbal 2006; Zweifel/Navia 
2000). This latter claim is based on two major causal pathways. The first pathway assumes that 
the accountability structures inherent in democratic systems of rule provide strong incentives 
for governments to address people’s needs (Iqbal 2006). The second pathway maintains that 
democratic representation, another fundamental characteristic of democracy, ensures that 
politicians and elected official consider a broad range of interests when making decisions. This 
in turn, translates into a more balanced policy output in terms of the spread and depth of 
government services (Halperin et al 2005; Zweifel/Navia 2000). We therefore focus on these two 
pathways of accountability and representation. 
IV6: Accountability
Conceptually, accountability refers to institutional structures in which a set of principals can 
hold agents accountable for their actions and influence their behavior through the threat of 
removal. In a political context, elections are a necessary element of accountability in democratic 
regimes because elections incentivize incumbents to work for the public interest in order to 
secure votes at election time. We operationalize accountability by measuring the mode through 
which the members of the executive branch of government are chosen. We follow Cheibub et 
al. (2009) who differentiate between “direct elections” – or election of the effective executive 
by popular vote; or the election of committed delegates for the purpose of executive selection 
(”indirect election”); or the selection of the effective executive by an elected assembly; or by an 
elected but uncommitted electoral college – and the non-elective mode including any means 
of executive selection not involving a direct or indirect mandate from an electorate (Osborne/
Gaebler 1992: 4). We recode the variable into a dummy variable, where one is coded whenever 
there are elections of the executive and zero in all other cases.
 IV7: Representation
Similarly to accountability, the representation of different social interests is expected to improve 
governance performance because representation reorients policy goals toward a plurality 
of interests and potentially works against a counterproductive fragmentation of society. At 
the same time, the ability to express potentially all social interests is another core element 
of democracy. In order to capture this concept, we use data from the well-known Polity IV 
dataset (Marshall et al. 2010). In particular, we use the Polity’s “competitiveness of participation” 
indicator (PARCOMP), which refers to the extent to which alternative preferences for policy and 
leadership can be pursued in the political arena (Ott 2010: 26).
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Explanatory Pathway 4: External Governance Support
An alternative to the domestic provision of governance services (be it by the state or by private 
substitution) is external provision. In the extreme, external actors such as the UN, foreign powers, 
or international Non-Governmental-Organizations (NGOs) may directly provide governance 
services in the form of food aid, refugee shelters, public health clinics, or schools. While these 
forms of direct external governance provision are difficult to measure cross-nationally, a less 
intrusive form of external governance support is bilateral foreign aid, usually disbursed to and 
administered by recipient governments. 
IV8: Foreign Aid
Data for foreign aid is available from the OECD’s Development Assistance Community and 
Creditor Reporting System databases (OECD Development Co-operation Directorate 2011). 
Similar to the debate on regime type, the literature posits all three possible hypotheses. 
Some authors argue that foreign aid has a positive effect on governance services. In the direct 
mechanism, aid substitutes for the lack of state services. In the indirect mechanism, conditional 
aid provides incentives for the state to improve domestic service provision (or the health sector 
see e.g.,  Bendavid/Bhattacharya 2009; Croghan et al. 2006;  Girod et al. 2009; Mishra; 2009). 
Critics maintain that foreign aid weakens domestic service provision by replacing government 
funding and capacity, which in turn destabilizes the respective local sector in the long term 
(see e.g., Farag et al. 2009; Rabkin et al. 2009). Other scholars argue that there is no clear-cut 
connection between foreign aid and the provision of governance services, either because overall 
the impact of foreign aid is too small to be detected or because positive and negative effects 
offset each other (Doucouliagos/Paldam 2009; Easterly 2009; Feyzioglu et al. 1998; Masud 2005; 
Rajan/Subramanian 2008; Wolf 2007).
Including foreign aid in the analysis can thus add to a lively debate. However, two significant 
problems with foreign aid data are the problems of reverse causality and non-random 
selection. In other words, foreign aid might go where it is most needed (where service provision 
is particularly low). If this is the case, then governance outcomes would explain foreign aid 
rather than the other way around, and in a cross-sectional approach the sign on the coefficient 
of foreign aid would be the opposite of that predicted by theory. We therefore tested for the 
correlation between foreign aid and governance outcomes, both in the aggregate and in 
particular in the health sector where we would expect such a connection to be particularly 
pronounced. We found, however, that even sector-specific health aid and a governance outcome 
indicator such as child mortality do not show a particularly high correlation, though it is worth 
pointing out that the question of who recieves aid is different from the question of how much 
aid recipients recieve.5 Recipient selection and aid distribution are dependent on a large range 
of political factors beyond ‘need’ (in the sense of low service provision) such as colonial past, 
political alliances, or policy performance of the recipient (Alesina/ Dollar 2000; Ball/ Johnson 
5 The correlation coefficient of the mean mortality rate and the mean health aid commitments is 0.2962.
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1998; Lundborg 1998). Still, in order to ‘control’ for endogeneity, we lagged this ten years from 
our baseline year of analysis (2008). The lag solves the problem of reverse causality but does 
not mitigate the selection problem. Countries that performed poorly ten years ago relative to 
other countries are unlikely to improve to such an extent that their relative position changes 
substantially enough to break the problem of selection. However, in light of limitations in the 
data and our research, we are unable to resolve this issue to our satisfaction.
Explanatory Pathway 5: Gender Equality / Female Empowerment
Since the 1970s, there has been an ongoing discussion about the role of women, gender 
discrimination, and development. The UN has organized four world conferences on women, 
the latest in 1995 in Beijing which led to the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action. 
The debate intensified in the context of the Beijing conference (Young 1993) and shifted from 
“women in development” to “gender and development”. Currently, the discussion revolves not 
only around issues such as the specific problems women face in developing countries (Kardam 
1991) or about the gender bias of existing development policies (Elson 1995; Momsen, 2004), 
but increasingly around the role women can play in increasing the overall effectiveness of 
development programs (Kerner 1999; Momsen 2004; UNDP 2006; VENRO 2010). In addition, 
major international organizations active in development policy institutionally acknowledge the 
importance of addressing gender issues. The UN created the UN Entity for Gender Equality and 
the Empowerment of Women (UN WOMEN) in 2010 to centralize and coordinate all of the UN’s 
gender activities. Organizations such as UNDP and UNESCO have made women’s empowerment 
an explicit part of their agenda in the context of their strategy for achieving the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDG). In the OECD context, both the Paris Declaration from 2005 and 
the Accra Agenda for Action from 2008 stress the strategic role of women for aid effectiveness 
and development. Acknowledging this debate, we have included the empowerment of women 
in our model as an additional independent variable to explain governance outcomes. Given the 
mainstream policy debate, the corresponding hypothesis is that the stronger the empowerment of 
women in any given the state, the better the respective governance performance.
IV9: Empowerment of Women
To capture female empowerment, we use a rather conservative indicator: The ratio of girls to 
boys in primary education corrected for the gender distribution of all children under the age 
of 15 in the respective population. The data come from the OECD Gender, Institutions, and 
Development Database (OECD Development Centre 2011). Other potential indicators (such as 
the gender wage distribution) suffer from severe problems of validity and coverage. Education 
ratios have the additional advantage in that we can assume a large variety of gender-specific 
indicators strongly correlate with girls’ education due to the fact that educational choices are 
not made by the children themselves but by their parents, taking into account the specific 
opportunity structure of a given institutional and cultural environment. It therefore seems 
reasonable to assume that in a society with a relatively high ratio of girls in primary education, 
the overall situation of women is better than in a society where this ratio is low.
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Explanatory Pathway 6: Environmental and Social Conditions
Finally, we considered the role of environmental and social conditions in the respective 
countries. The particularity of these factors lies in the fact that they are independent of the 
respective issues and can be seen as framework conditions that may facilitate or complicate the 
achievement of governance goals and service provision. These factors may shape governance 
outcomes beyond institutions, capabilities, and intentions and are thus controlled for in our 
models. The implicit hypothesis here is that the more adverse the environmental or social conditions, 
the worse the corresponding governance outcomes. 
We consider two types of such factors: environmental and social conditions. The environmental 
conditions may influence how severe the governance problems are that social actors are facing. 
For instance, whether malaria is endemic in any given country has direct consequences for 
the difficulty of achieving adequate health governance outcomes. Such factors thus influence 
what we call the “size of the challenge” that governance actors have to face. Regarding social 
conditions, we focus on societal fragmentation, following the existing discussion about its 
effects for the provision of collective goods.
IV10: Size of the Challenge
As outlined above, the variable “size of the challenge” captures factors usually beyond the control 
of governance actors that may influence the difficulty inherent in supplying collective goods. 
These factors are specific to the governance task at hand, so we consider different factors for the 
different governance dimensions introduced above. For security governance, we control for the 
absolute size of the population based on the simple assumption that all else equal, it is easier 
to pacify a smaller population than a larger one. For economic subsistence, we account for the 
proportion of the population living in arid or dry climates (based on the Köppen-Geiger climate 
classification and the data set by Gallup et al. (1999)). This variable reflects the fact adverse natural 
conditions can greatly limit basic agricultural subsistence. For public health, we control whether 
malaria is endemic (a dichotomous variable based on the World Malaria Report (WHO 2011)). 
For education, we again use the absolute size of the population, assuming that the challenges of 
managing a complex educational sector rise with the number of children to be educated. For 
infrastructure governance, we control for the absolute geographic size of the country based on the 
assumption that managing an adequate infrastructure becomes significantly more complex 
with larger territory. Finally, for environmental governance, we consider the size of each country’s 
industrial sector. Strictly speaking, the size of the industrial sector is not a factor beyond the 
control of governance actors but is rather a policy outcome in its own right. However, such 
decisions are taken prior to and are decoupled from environmental concerns. Since industrial 
production is prone to cause pollution (much more so than agriculture and service industries), 
we consider industry as a major influence on the size of the challenge governance actors face 
when addressing environmental concerns.
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IV11: Social Fragmentation
Among the many structural social factors potentially influencing governance outcomes, 
ethnic, linguistic, or social fragmentation commands a particularly prominent role. Some 
authors assume fragmentation has strong negative effects on the provision of what we call 
governance services. They argue that in a polarized environment, it is more difficult to achieve 
consensus on public policies since different groups have competing opinions on the provision 
and quality of public goods (Easterly/Levine 1997); that there are generally higher transaction 
and transmission costs (Kimenyi 2006); or that in case of asymmetric fragmentation, the most 
powerful ethnic group might install policies in its own interest with negative consequences for 
the rest of society (Kimenyi 2006). 
Other scholars argue that fragmentation might actually have a positive effect on the provision 
of public goods. If the state fails to provide such goods, people might turn to their ethnic 
communities for self-provision of public goods and services (Alesina/ Zhuravskayay 2009; 
Kimenyi 2006). Self-provision might be successful because long-term attachment to one’s own 
ethnic group, in-group norms, social sanctions, same tastes, or shared values make cooperation 
within an ethnic group easier (Alesina/Zhuravskayay 2009; Kimenyi 2006). In addition, 
uncertainty about the contributions, preferences or prosperity of other groups increases the 
willingness to contribute privately to a public good (Schündeln 2013). 
In order to capture fragmentation, we use data from the Minorities at Risk (MAR) project (MAR 
2009). Since its 2007 revision, MAR focuses specifically on ethnopolitical groups, i.e., non-
state communal groups that meet a set of criteria clustered around membership by descent, 
distinguishing cultural features (such as a common language), and a minimum absolute or 
relative size (MAR 2009: 1). More specifically, we use MAR’s data on the aggregate number of 
politicized groups per year and country and the aggregate share of the population of those 
politicized groups per year and country. Our fragmentation measure is then calculated as 1 (% 
of pop / # of groups) per year and country.
Potential Causal Pathways not Included
Besides the six explanatory pathways introduced above, there are at least two significant 
alternative explanations for governance outcomes that merit attention. Below we sketch the 
respective perspectives and explain why we have not included them as separate independent 
variables in our study.
Originating in a 1989 World Bank study (The World Bank 1989: 60) about the “crisis of governance” 
and rephrased over the next years by Kaufmann et al. (2009; 2007; 2004; 2002; 1999) the term 
‘good governance’ refers to a broad discussion that assumes a central role for certain qualities 
of public institutions and certain institutional preconditions for the economic development 
of a state. Note that in this literature, ‘good governance’ is logically located on the side of the 
state and its institutions - not on what we call ‘governance’ in terms of governance services 
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or governance outcomes. At the same time, it only partly overlaps with our (rather narrow) 
statehood definition that focuses on the MoF as well as implementation and enforcement 
capabilities. In the original World Bank publications, good governance did refer to government 
effectiveness (closely linked to our measure of bureaucratic quality, see above), but it went far 
beyond this notion by including institutional characteristics such as accountability, political 
stability, absence of corruption, and rule of law (including the guarantee of property rights). 
Other institutions such as the OECD (1993) have taken the discussion further and included 
more genuinely political characteristics such as participation, respect for human rights, or 
democracy. Today, a large variety of these institutional characteristics can be found under the 
heading of good governance in many different combinations. The central assumption is always 
the same: “good” institutions can improve governance performance (see e.g., Hall/Jones 1999; 
Knack/Keefer 1995; Mauro 1995; Olson et al. 2000). 
We did not include good governance as a separate explanatory pathway in our study because 
some elements significantly overlap with what we already include (such as bureaucratic quality, 
representation, or accountability). Others, such as corruption and bureaucratic quality, are 
difficult to separate conceptually and empirically, leading to high collinearity (and the problem 
of multicollinearity in regression analyses). For the rest of the more prominent elements of 
good governance, such as government responsiveness or rule of law, valid large-N worldwide 
data is unfortunately not available. 
The second alternate explanatory pathway is colonial legacy, an explanation prominently 
associated with Acemoglu et al. (2000). For some scholars, colonial legacy is methodologically 
prior to some of the independent variables we include, such as regime type or economic capacity 
(Bertocchi/Canova 2002; Lange 2004; Lange/Dawson 2009), and could thus not be meaningfully 
included in the same analysis. More closely related to our framework is the hypothesized direct 
impact of colonial rule on current governance outcomes of former colonies (Iyer 2010; Lange, 
2004). Lange states that the form of colonial rule can “hinder state governance when they create 
extremely powerful local intermediaries and limit state infrastructural power” (Lange 2004: 
917). This mechanism assumes strong path dependence from former modes of accountability 
to present governance outcomes. While it would be interesting to test this theory, there is no 
consensus about an appropriate typology of colonial domination (Lange 2004: 917). In addition, 
the respective forms of rule shifted over time within colonies (Martin and West 1999: 190). 
To the authors’ knowledge, there is no dataset that satisfyingly captures these complex facets, 
which made it impossible to include it as a variable.
3. The big picture: A global model of governance outcomes
In this section we present the results of the analysis for the aggregation of all six dimensions of 
governance which provides an overall picture of the governance performance of the respective 
states. However, an important caveat has to be kept in mind: the number of observations decreases 
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with aggregation. As more indicators are aggregated, the missing values of all of the indicators 
add up so that more and more cases drop out. Still, the ‘big picture’ already illustrates some of 
the insights that the disaggregated analysis will confirm later. The governance aggregate used 
for this purpose is computed as the mean value of six standardized and normalized indicators, 
one from each governance dimension.6 
In this analysis we use a full multivariate model with all eleven independent variables introduced 
above. Accordingly, we present in Figure 1 a scatterplot depicting the residual variance in 
governance. In other words, the scatterplot shows the variance in governance not explained 
by the alternate independent variables. For the purposes of this illustration, we aggregated 
all three statehood variables (MoF, bureaucratic quality, and cost of claim) into one overall 
statehood variable. 
Figure 1: The result of the multivariate regression shows the limited explanatory power of 
the aggregate statehood indicator, whose beta coefficient is around 0.27.
Even a cursory glance at the distribution of the residuals confirms the ‘governance puzzle’ (i.e. 
the limited explanatory power of the aggregate statehood indicator), and also shows that in the 
full multivariate model, the explanatory power of statehood is even smaller than in the bivariate 
approach. In this scatterplot, hardly any positive linear tendency is discernible. This impression 
can be confirmed in a more sophisticated manner when looking at the actual multivariate 
regression results presented in Table 1.
6 The indicators used are a security measure based on lethal violence, number of children notunderweight 
(for economic subsistence), average life expectancy (health), the pupil teacher ratio (education), 
electrification rates (infrastructure), and pm10 concentration (environment). They are introduced in 
greater detail in their respective sections below.
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R-squared 75 77 82
Adj. R-squared 0.699 0.684 0.665
Robust t-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
The full model is presented in the first column (1). However, an analysis of the correlation 
coefficients reveals a strong connection between bureaucratic quality and mean income. In other 
words, wealthier societies tend to have better functioning state institutions. While this may not 
be too surprising theoretically, the resulting multicollinearity influences the regression results. 
Since we did not want to drop either of these conceptually distinct but empirically related 
variables, we decided to present in all cases additional results with only one of the respective 
variables ((2) and (3)). We therefore pay special attention to the results that appear robust across 
all three of these models. 
The first result to note is the R2. On this level of abstraction (and given the low N), it is remarkable 
to see that our model can explain about 60% of the variation in overall governance outcomes.
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However, the MoF, bureaucratic quality, and enforcement capability – which we measure as 
access to the legal system – do not contribute to the explanatory power of the model. Neither 
of these factors shows a significant association with aggregate governance outcomes. Given the 
breadth of the issue areas covered by this aggregate, this may appear less surprising for the MoF 
or enforcement capability, but it is rather surprising for bureaucratic quality. 
The effect of mean income is only visible in a model that does not take bureaucratic quality into 
account (this is due to collinearity between these two factors). Still, the conclusion is that mean 
income improves governance outcomes. This result is not surprising. What is surprising is that 
the substantive effect is comparatively small in absolute terms, and is in turn reduced by the 
effect of income inequality which drives overall governance performance down.
Neither regime type indicators shows a significant effect on overall governance performance. 
This is also rather remarkable and might be attributed to the breadth of issues covered by the 
governance aggregate. However, it does mean that we find no evidence for accountability or 
representation structures significantly influencing overall governance performance. 
The same applies to foreign aid. The lagged variables show a negative effect on governance 
outcomes, but overall aid is only marginally significantly related to our outcomes.
Quite remarkably, there is an extremely strong and robust effect of our measure of the 
empowerment of women. States where girls are being educated in proportion to their share 
in the population fare significantly better in overall governance performance than those states 
where this is not the case.
Besides land area, only the dry/arid climate of the indicators for environmental and social 
conditions is significant, albeit marginally. Again, this result may be due to the high level of 
aggregation, especially with regard to the environmental conditions which we conceptualized 
as issue area specific. 
In sum, we can conclude that for aggregate governance performance our model explains 
a large amount of variation. The explanation, however, apparently does not lie in statehood. 
Overall governance performance appears to be influenced by (or at least associated with) the 
empowerment of women, the mean income level, and environmental conditions – in that order.
4. A Closer View: The dimensions of Governance
In this section, we disaggregate governance and present the results of the multivariate analysis 
for security governance, economic subsistence, public health, education, infrastructure, and 
environment respectively.
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4.1 Security Governance Outcomes
In order to analyze the impact of our explanatory variables on security we aim to measure 
security provision using security governance outcomes. In fact, we do not measure external 
security of the state but center our attention on internal security only. Internal security refers “to 
the ability of a state’s citizens to live free from immediate danger to their lives and livelihood” 
(Schröder 2010: 19). We conceptualize security provision as the absence of violence leading to 
death which we consider a rather uncontroversial goal of (security) governance. Most people 
would agree that whenever a non-natural death occurs, security governance has failed. We thus 
use homicide rates as one of our core indicators for security provision, as these “may well be 
the most reliable and valid source of crime data for country comparisons currently available” 
(Schröder 2010: 21). 
On its own, this measure is incomplete. Due to the conceptual difference between state-centered 
and people-centered security, homicide rates do not account for deaths due to internal conflict. 
In fact, the 2011 data of the UN Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice 
Systems conducted by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC 2011), explicitly excludes 
“death in conflict” (UNODC 2011: 1). We developed a simple framework for our measure of 
security governance, separating forms of violence by distinguishing the degree of organization 
of the participating actors and victims of violence. For lethal violence among the population, 
we use homicides as outlined above. To capture one-sided violence by organized groups, which 
includes state violence against the civilian population, we supplement the homicide count with 
the UCDP One-Sided Violence data (Eck/Hultman 2007). Next, we capture violence among armed 
groups without state participation in the context of inner-state conflict by including UCDP data 
on non-state violence (Eck et al. 2010). Finally, to include lethal violence in inner-state conflicts 
with participation of the state, we also add the battle death count from UCDP’s Battle-Related 
Deaths dataset (UCDP 2011). The following matrix illustrates our indicator according to actors 
involved in fatal violence.
Table 2: Composition of the security provision indicator 
                     Victim
Aggressor
State Groups Population
State Battle Related Deaths Battle Related Deaths One-Sided Violence
Groups Battle Related Deaths Non State Violence One-Sided Violence
Population One-Sided Violence One-Sided Violence Homicide Rates
Table 3 presents regression results for two different dependent variables. Columns 1 to 3 show 
the results for our objective indicator; the overall fatality count per 100,000 people is shown. 
The last three columns complement this view with a subjective measure of security, the results 
of a Gallup World Poll survey question that asked whether respondents “feel safe walking alone 
at nights […] where you live”. Gallup data were collected from the 2010 Human Development 
Report (UNDP 2010: 180-83).
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Table 3: Multivariate regression results for security prevision and perceived level of safety 
VARIABLES







































































































































































Observations 104 108 118 103 107 115
R-squared 0.364 0.357 0.377 0.520 0.514 0.395
Adj. R-squared 0.287 0.291 0.318 0.462 0.463 0.337
t-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
First, for security governance outcomes, our model is comparatively weak. In fact, it shows the 
second lowest R2 of all the multivariate analyses (about 30%).
Most strikingly, our measure of MoF does not significantly affect the objective measure 
of provision of security. An in-depth analysis shows that the reason for this are influential 
outliers such as Honduras, Venezuela, and El Salvador, where homicide rates of more than 
60 deaths per 100,000 outweigh even the highest fatality numbers from the UCDP conflict 
datasets. These extreme homicide rates coincide with a high level of MoF according to our 
measure and other measures such as BTI (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2008), which leads to weak 
and insignificant regression coefficients. Furthermore, an analysis of one-sided violence fatality 
estimates on a sample of Somalia shows that the UCDP data may err on the conservative side 
when excluding unknown actors from their data set. We compared their high estimates with 
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the “Event Data Project on Conflict and Security (EDACS)”7 whose fatality counts turned out to 
be higher by a factor of about two (but which covers only Sub-Sahara Africa and Somalia). In 
sum, we thus suspect that (a) the extreme crime situation in some Latin American countries 
should translate into a different coding for the MoF; and that (b) some of our indicators may 
(relatively) underestimate conflict fatalities. We therefore ran a robust regression using an MM 
estimator on security governance outcomes, a method that is robust to distortions by outliers 
(Verardi/Croux 2009). The robust regression does not yield a comparable R2, but it does show 
that when outliers are controlled for, the MoF does have a significant impact on security 
governance outcomes. We thus conclude with caution that the MoF is associated with security 
governance outcomes, but that the effect is much less clear than we expected and that a number 
of Latin-American countries provide interesting outliers where a formal MoF is tremendously 
challenged by extreme crime. The other statehood indicators do remain insignificant – even in 
the robust regression.
While economic capacity also does not play a role, a very strong and highly significant effect is 
visible between economic inequality and security governance. This effect remains robust for 
every model specification and suggests a clear association between absence of violent fatalities 
and economic equality – a link that has been both contested (Neumayer 2003) and supported 
(Jacobs/Richardson, 2008; Kelly 2000) in previous contributions. All other variables, including 
those for regime type and economic development, to which Neumayer (2003) attributed a 
mitigating effect, remain insignificant.
We thus conclude that economic inequality is by far the strongest predictor of violent fatalities, 
with the MoF, state institutions, and regime type playing a surprisingly small role.
In contrast, the results for the subjective evaluation of the security situation tell a different 
story and overall the model performs somewhat better. The effect of inequality remains robust 
(but is somewhat weaker), as does the minor role played by the MoF (in the robust regression). 
However, we do see two additional and rather remarkable effects. For the subjective evaluation 
of security, both bureaucratic quality and foreign aid do play a role. Both variables increase 
the perception of security, even though this effect does not exist when the dependent variable 
is the objective measure. In other words, the subjective perception of security increases with 
bureaucratic quality and foreign aid – even if objectively speaking there is no such effect. 
Even more striking, accountability structures (which also objectively do not play a role) show 
a strong, significant, and robust negative effect on the perception of security. The presence of 
accountability structures thus drives down the perception of security; though these results may 
indicate responder bias. Respondents seem to evaluate security based on their perception of 
the state’s overall bureaucratic performance and on the presence of external help. The negative 
effect of accountability may also be attributed to bias in the sense of respondents not correctly 
reporting their opinions in, say, authoritarian regimes or, alternatively, we would have to 
7  The EDACS data set is tentatively available for download beginning of May 2012;www.conflict-data.
org.
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acknowledge that such regimes (despite their various flaws) do instill a sense of security in their 
citizens (independent from their actual performance in the security field).
Overall, security governance outcomes are thus best explained by economic inequality and to a 
surprisingly small degree by the MoF; security perceptions, however, are influenced by a more 
complex set of conditions.
4.2 Economic Subsistence Outcomes
Economic subsistence is a difficult concept to measure, and we rely on two objective proxy 
variables and one subjective variable. First, we use the percentage of children not underweight 
as a proxy for the ability to meet basic levels of subsistence. This variable is defined as the 
percentage of children younger than five years old who are not underweight, where underweight 
is measured as being two standard deviations from the median weight recommended in the 
World Health Organization (WHO)’s child growth standards. The base data for this measure 
come from the WHO, but because of inadequate geographic coverage, we supplement this 
measure with data from Save the Children, a NGO based in the United Kingdom, and UNICEF’s 
2008 Child Development Index. We also transform the original variable from the WHO, which 
is a percentage of children who are underweight.
Our second proxy for economic subsistent is the percentage of the population with access to 
an improved water source. Examples of improved water sources include household connections, 
protected wells or springs, or boreholes. Unimproved sources include water vendors and tanker 
trucks. Data come from World Development Indicators.
Third, we use the results from a Gallup (2011) survey where respondents were asked whether 
there was a time over the last 12 months where they were unable to afford adequate housing. We 
recoded the data so that the lowest ratio of positive respondents now achieves the highest score. 
We obtained Gallup data from the data cataloged for the HDI.
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Table 4: Multivariate regression results for economic subsistence outcomes and perception 
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Our statistical analysis in Table 4 presents a mixed picture. Although our regression models 
explain more than half the variation in the percentage of underweight children and access 
to water, few of our variables reach statistical significance. The three statehood measures are 
not statistically significant predictors of underweight children. In some ways, this outcome 
is unsurprising. Economic subsistence is a complex governance outcome: it is the product of 
choices at the state-level but also in the private home and economic spheres. While we might 
expect the state’s MoF or administrative capacity to play a role in mitigating some of the 
problems related to underweight and malnourished children, this role appears to be too small 
to be detected by our model. We note that we observe no statistical significant coefficient on 
the state’s enforcement capability, but we do not find this result to be unexpected. 
Statehood performs marginally better when the economic subsistence proxy is access to an 
improved water source. Here, the state’s bureaucratic capacity is positively and significantly 
related to the percentage of population with access to water. The difference here may be that 
access to water is a relatively linear and simple task, involving the construction and maintenance 
of protected sources. The state’s administrative apparatus may have a direct role in providing 
this public good, which would be consistent with the results in the table. 
We do find small effects of mean income consistent with the discussion in the previous 
paragraph. As the population’s mean income increases, individuals are better positioned to 
provide for their families in ways that would increase the number of non-underweight children. 
Mean income is also predictive of access to water, which could suggest that individuals and 
communities are better financially positioned to make improvements to water sources.
Foreign aid displays a negative relationship with both economic subsistence variables, though 
it is not always statistically significant. This result is almost certainly due to the selection effects 
of aid, which is likely being disbursed to countries with worse relative economic subsistence 
outcomes. Even with the ten year lag and generous assumptions about positive effects of aid, 
this selection effect is likely to persist through time. Low performing countries may improve 
subsistence levels in an absolute sense but not in a relative sense, which would preserve the 
tendency to give to countries with worse relative outcomes. 
Female empowerment is strongly statistically significant and in the predicted direction. Three 
mechanisms could explain this result. First, one direct mechanism could be that as a greater 
proportion of children attend school, a greater number of girls are able to access meals at 
school that they would not have had if they did not attend school. Second, in poorer countries, 
households do not often have enough food to provide nutritious meals, so schools that offer 
meals can help address this nourishment problem while at the same time offering a strong 
incentive to increase attendance and enrollment rates. This would suggest a reverse mechanism, 
where better nutrition has a positive causal effect on female enrollment rates. However, this 
mechanism is unlikely to operate in places where gender norms are such that girls and women 
have highly unequal opportunities. The third possible mechanism is a longer term one. 
Educated girls are more likely to find higher-paying jobs than uneducated girls once they enter 
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the workforce.8 The increased financial resources that they bring home could allow families to 
better nourish their children leading, in turn, to better economic subsistence outcomes. These 
mechanisms are consistent with the World Food Program’s view that women are key to reducing 
hunger. Empowering women and encouraging girls to attend school are two key pillars of the 
WFP’s approach to reducing hunger and improving nutrition.
Female empowerment also displays a strong substantively and statistically significant 
relationship with access to water. Again, two mechanisms might be at work. First, there has been 
increasing international recognition of the role of women and water access. Women are the 
prime users of  ‘domestic water’, so a greater proportion of educated and empowered women 
could lead to demand-side efforts to obtain sustainable access to improved water sources (UN 
Division for the Advancement of Women DESA 2005). A reverse mechanism may be at work as 
well. A recent World Bank paper suggests that female enrollments increase as a result of better 
access to rural water infrastructure by releasing girls from water collection, a laborious, time-
consuming, and primarily female-dominated task (Koolwal/van de Walle 2010).
Finally, our measure for the size of the challenge, the percentage not of the population living 
in dry or arid climates, is negatively related to economic subsistence rates – as expected. Arid 
climates are more challenging environments for growing crops, so food may be scarcer in these 
regions. It is therefore not surprising that as the percentage of population living in arid zones 
increases, the percentage of non-underweight children decreases. Curiously, this variable is not 
statistically significant for water access, but it is worth noting that while overall water access is 
likely worse in arid climates, access to improved sources appears not to have this relationship.
Turning to our subjective indicator, our model’s adjusted fit reaches 49.9%. Again, bureaucratic 
capacity appears to be a strong predictor for the subjective measure, this time together with 
mean income. Housing may be provided by private as well as public actors. The results shown 
in the table suggest both the state to have a role in providing shelter and housing as do private 
resources as measured by mean income. This result does not come as a surprise; the survey 
aimed to find situational cases of unaffordable housing, and an increase in income would 
directly mitigate these cases, up to a certain degree. 
In sum, the statehood indicators perform relatively poorly in this model of economic subsistence 
governance. While our models explain a non-trivial amount of variation, other explanations 
likely play important roles in explaining these outcomes.
8 We assume that societies that encourage female education are more likely to accept female participation 
in the workforce.
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4.3 Public Health Governance Outcomes
We use three indicators to measure the quality of health. Our first objective indicator, average 
life expectancy at birth, measures the number of years a newborn child is expected to live given 
current trends in mortality and health care. This measure is a broad proxy for the quality of 
the overall health system, including primary, secondary, and tertiary health. The data for this 
measure come from the HDI, which in turn draws upon data from the UN Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs. 
Our second objective indicator, the under-5 mortality rate, is defined as the number of deaths of 
children before their fifth birthday per 1,000 live births. Unlike our other health governance 
indicator, under-5 mortality is a proxy for the quality of the primary health system. Interventions 
that reduce under-5 mortality depend on the availability of basic health services, skilled medical 
personnel, health infrastructure, as well as practices in the home or community such as 
breastfeeding. Data come from the University of Washington’s Institute for Health Metrics and 
Evaluation. 
Our final indicator is a subjective measure of the percentage of the population that report 
satisfaction with health care quality, as measured by the Gallup World Poll Database in 2010 and 
compiled by the Human Development Report 2011.
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Table 5: Multivariate regression results for health governance outcomes and perception of 
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Table 5 shows the regression results for the two objective health care indicators. The first measure 
of statehood, the state’s monopoly over violence, is only marginally statistically significant in 
most models and with a small coefficient. Of note is the sign which is consistently in the wrong 
predicted direction. Several influential observations are responsible for this result, including 
Malawi, Togo, Botswana, and Zambia, who score very low on our health indicators but have an 
unchallenged state MoF; or Indonesia which scores comparatively well but whose MoF was 
challenged at the time of observation. When we run the regressions without these data points, 
the sign on the coefficient flips, but the result is not statistically significant for either dependent 
variable.
As expected, the quality of bureaucracy has a positive, statistically significant effect on average 
life expectancy. While the substantive importance of bureaucracy appears to be relatively small, 
this result is not surprising given that this independent variable captures the bureaucracy as a 
whole, rather than the health sector bureaucracy. Still, the result suggests that an administratively 
more capable state is better equipped to deliver the services necessary for improving average 
life expectancy. This result is robust to the exclusion of the mean income variable. The other 
statehood measure, cost of claim, is only statistically significant when bureaucratic quality and 
mean income are not both included in the model. It is not clear how enforcement capability 
related to access to the justice system can improve life expectancy. 
Turning to the second objective indicator, under-5 mortality rates, the beneficial effects of the 
state appear to have dissipated. Neither variable is robust across specifications, but it is worth 
pointing out that greater administrative capacity appears to reduce under-5 mortality rates in 
model 5. The loss of significance of the statehood measures for this health outcome could be 
a result of the heavy emphasis on child health among donors and NGOs. Goal 4 of the MDG 
seeks to reduce under-5 mortality by two-thirds between 1990 and 2015. If this goal reflects 
widespread international and non-state interest and activity in providing funding, services, 
training, and other assistance for achieving this target, then it is not surprising that statehood 
indicators are not strongly predictive of under-5 mortality rates. 
Economic inequality is strongly related to health outcomes. Greater inequality is associated with 
decreased life expectancy and higher mortality rates, though with the latter outcome inequality 
is only statistically significant in one of our three models. One mechanism by which inequality 
might affect health outcomes is purely economic: Where a small fraction of the population 
holds most of the wealth, the rest of the population has fewer private resources to pay for health 
services, especially in the absence of public provision. This mechanism is more plausible for the 
life expectancy case, where the results are strongest (in statistical terms). For under-5 mortality, 
access to economic resources to pay for private health services may help only the margins. Many 
of the interventions that can save the lives of young children, conditional on surviving past 
the first month of life, can be delivered in the home or community, and are not prohibitively 
expensive (Jones et al. 2003). This would explain why economic inequality may matter less for 
the narrower health governance outcome captured by under-5 mortality rates.
The Pillars of Governance. A Macro-Quantitative Analysis of Governance Performance  |  32
The lag of health aid consistently has the wrong predicted sign in all models of health governance. 
This result is a likely consequence of the fact that the countries with poorer health outcomes 
are more likely to receive health aid than countries with better health outcomes. Unfortunately, 
our research design does not allow us to mitigate this endogeneity problem. However, existing 
research suggests that health aid does have a casual beneficial effect on mortality outcomes 
(Mishra 2009).
The ratio of female education is strongly statistically significant and in the predicted direction. 
Countries with higher levels of female empowerment are likely to be the same countries where 
women have more freedom to access professional health services, both for themselves and for 
their dependents. Since women tend to be the primary caregivers in many societies, a greater 
freedom to access health services could lead to better health outcomes. Female education may 
also have direct effects on health. Girls who attend school may be able to receive some basic 
health care services at school, and they may be healthier overall, if they also receive meals at 
school that are more nutritious than those received at home.
Some of the results described above did not hold when the dependent variable in the model was 
the subjective indicator of perceived quality of health care. The bureaucracy quality measure 
was statistically significant and in the correct direction: as the state becomes more capable, 
perceptions of health care are more positive. This result is somewhat surprising given that 
statehood indicators were not strong and robust predictors of objective health. However, it may 
be that individuals living in high capacity, administratively competent states may conclude 
that their health is actually relatively good – or at least better than it would be if the state’s rule 
making and rule enforcement capabilities were ineffective.9
The enforcement capability indicator produced some surprising results with respect to 
perceived health quality. As access to the justice system becomes more expensive, individuals 
were on average more likely to report being satisfied with their health care. This is an artifact 
due to countries with low attorney fees and low perceived health outcomes, such as Guinea and 
Nigeria on the one hand, but also because some countries fare well in the perception of the 
respondents in spite of difficult access to the court system, such as Mozambique and Indonesia 
in our sample. Under this interpretation, the state’s rule enforcement ability has no causal effect 
on the perceived quality of health.  
Female empowerment remained an important explanatory variable in our regression models 
with the subjective dependent variable. Empowered women may have a more optimistic outlook 
on their health because of their greater ability to care for themselves and for their dependents.
9 One problem with this mechanism is that the opposite story is also entirely plausible: in places where 
the bureaucracy is poor, individuals might conclude that, all things considered, their health is relatively 
good.
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4.4 Educational Governance Outcomes
Measuring educational governance is inherently difficult. Most existing cross-national indicators 
do not speak directly to concerns about the quality of education. Literacy rates perhaps come 
closest to capturing quality, but are insensitive measures for higher-performing states, where 
much of the variation in education quality occurs elsewhere. Moreover, literacy rate data is 
not available for most countries in our sample. Instead, we use two proxies for educational 
governance.10 Our first measure is the average pupil-teacher ratio in primary education. The data is 
compiled by the UNESCO Institute for Statics (UNESCO Institute for Statistics 2010). We argue 
that countries with poor or inadequate educational systems are those that stretch beyond their 
capacity to accommodate more students. While educating more students might seem to be a 
laudable goal, a higher pupil-teacher ratio suggests that the time a teacher can devote to each 
student decreases  (UNESCO Institute for Statistics 2009). While a lower pupil teacher ratio 
alone does not necessarily result in better education outcomes, it can greatly improve student’s 
performance, e.g., when combined with tracking (Duflo et al. 2012), generally allowing for 
better student teacher interaction (Blatchford et al. 2003; Blatchford et al. 2007). Furthermore, 
the measure is highly correlated with several indicators of educational attainment, such as 
completion and transition rates. 
Our second measure of education is the expected years of schooling a child of school entrance 
age can expect to receive. Data come from UNESCO and this indicator is included in the HDI 
beginning in 2011. Higher values on this variable indicate that children, on average, receive 
more education and stay in school longer.
10  We considered two commonly-used measures of educational performance: primary enrollment rates 
and primary completion rates. We do not use enrollment rates because high enrollments do not imply 
high attendance rates. Enrollment rates are thus not useful for our purposes because they do not relate 
closely to the quality of education. We also do not use primary completion rates, an indicator often 
employed in the literature as a solution to the poor validity of enrollment rates. Completion rates can 
exceed 100% because students may complete school either early or late. We do not use completion 
rates because we wish to distinguish countries that graduate primary students on time from those 
that graduate students late. We also declined to truncate the variable at 100% because countries that 
graduate many students late would still falsely appear to perform better than countries that graduate 
most of their students on time. Primary completion rates may also be codetermined by the intake 
capacity of the secondary schooling system.
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Table 6: Multivariate regression results for education governance outcomes 
VARIABLES










































































































































































Observations 94 97 111 105 109 122
R-squared 0.636 0.620 0.652 0.778 0.738 0.781
Adj. R-squared 0.587 0.576 0.617 0.752 0.711 0.761
Robust t-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
The results in Table 6 follow a now-familiar pattern. Statehood variables almost uniformly have 
no statistical significance across our models and dependent variables. A higher MoF does not 
lead to better educational outcomes, though it is worth pointing out that our MoF variable 
captures negative security – the absence of violent challenges to the state’s authority. Given our 
dependent variables, there is not a priori reason to expect a higher MoF to improve the quality 
of education. 
Bureaucratic capacity and enforcement capacity also do not display robust statistically 
significant relationships with our outcome variables. General administrative capacity may not 
have an explanatory role because it is too insensitive of a measure; the ICRG’s expert raters 
are unlikely to have considered the quality of the education bureaucracy when they coded this 
measure, and fine-grained distinctions are in any case not possible. We should not conclude that 
bureaucratic capacity does not affect educational quality, only that if the state’s administrative 
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capacity matters, we cannot detect it here in this model. On the other hand, we see no reason 
why greater access to justice would affect either the pupil-teacher ratio or expected years of 
schooling, and we do not find the lack of significance surprising in that regard.
Mean income and economic inequality are associated with both education measures in the 
expected direction. Higher mean incomes are associated with lower pupil-teacher ratios and 
longer expected years of schooling, while greater inequality is associated with higher ratios 
and shorter duration of education. These two indicators combined suggest that not only 
that private income matters, but that the distribution of that income is critical. In particular, 
private economic capacity can be a decisive factor in the quality of education. Decisions about 
enrollment, attendance, and duration of education may depend on the ability of families to pay 
for public school fees or private school tuition. Low income families may face greater hardship 
in sending children to school, so higher levels of average income may explain why more pupils 
can attend school (perhaps increasing pupil-teacher ratios) for longer periods of time (increasing 
expected years of schooling). Mean income may also speak to expectations about the returns to 
education. The availability of jobs paying reasonable wages may increase mean income, which 
would suggest that the returns of staying in school longer are worth forgoing opportunities in 
the present, such as helping in the home or entering the labor market early.
We find some evidence that greater democratic accountability positively affects the mean 
number of expected years of schooling. One mechanism that could explain this relationship is 
the idea that accountability pressures force elected officials to be more responsive to demands 
for better education in the form of longer expected years of education. Stasavage (2005) finds 
evidence from Africa consistent with this mechanism: Democratically elected governments in 
Africa have spent more on education than non-democratically elected governments (Stasavage 
2005). Ansell (2008) makes a similar argument, suggesting that democracies spend more on 
education due to the redistributive nature of education spending, especially at the primary 
level (Ansell 2008). If increased spending also increases the quality of education, students may 
choose to stay longer in school. Increased spending could also allow the state to fund both 
primary and secondary schooling.
Finally, female empowerment is once again a strong predictor of the quality of educational 
services. Higher ratios of female attendance in school are associated with lower student-teacher 
ratios and longer expected years of education. 
4.5 Infrastructure Governance Outcomes
With this governance dimension we cover the quality of a state’s infrastructure. We selected two 
very different aspects of infrastructure: electricity and Internet access. The former is a classical 
element of infrastructure governance, traditionally closely associated with the state (or at least 
state oversight), while the latter refers to a much more recent infrastructure element of rapidly 
increasing relevance. Moreover, Internet access is neutral with regard to the provider. State-
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provided or subsidized access exists alongside completely private initiatives. In addition, Internet 
access incorporates other infrastructural elements (such as mobile telecommunications or the 
availability of a cable grid) because the indicator is neutral with regard to the means of access. 
Electricity data comes from the International Energy Agency (2011), which compiles statistics 
about “electricity access at the household level, i.e., the number of people who have electricity in 
their home. It comprises electricity sold commercially, both on-grid and off-grid” (International 
Energy Agency 2011: 1).11 For Internet access, we use the number of Internet users per 100 
inhabitants in any given country. Data come from the World Development Indicators catalog 
compiled from information from the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) and 
World Bank estimates (World Bank 2010).
Table 7: Multivariate regression results for infrastructure governance outcomes  
VARIABLES
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)





































































































































































Observations 99 102 108 103 107 120
R-squared 0.664 0.663 0.631 0.845 0.774 0.805
Adj. R-squared 0.621 0.625 0.592 0.827 0.751 0.787
Robust t-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
11  Because of systematic gaps in data coverage for OECD countries, we used the regional aggregates for 
some cases.
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Table 7 summarizes the respective regression results. For electrification rates, the model 
performs well as it explains close to and above 60% of the variation. Once more, the statehood 
indicators produce no significant results – with the notable exception of our measure for 
enforcement capabilities which shows a robust positive connection to electrification rates. 
Economic capacity does not play a role while inequality seems to drive down electrification 
rates. Neither of the regime type variables produces a significant effect, foreign aid also has 
no robust effect. However, once more, the indicator for female empowerment is strong and 
shows a robust correlation with a better electricity infrastructure. Finally, electrification rates 
increase with the size of the respective country – while we expected that a larger area would 
make this task more difficult. Notable is the poor performance of bureaucratic quality which 
could be seen as indicating a smaller role of the state in electrification than we assumed. 
For all variables that do show robust effects, however, we have difficulties theorizing a direct 
causal link. It is not clear why access to the legal system, equality, or the empowerment of 
women should have a direct positive impact on electrification rates. We expect a prior variable 
influencing both electrification rates and the respective independent variables. For instance, a 
regional study by Kemmler (2006) confirms the effect of economic inequality but also suggests 
economic structure of the region and employment and social status, such as caste membership 
of household members, as possible determinants of electrification rates, particular in rural 
areas –  which may codetermine enrollment rates of girls in this case.
In the case of Internet access, the picture looks quite different. First of all, this particular model 
shows the highest R2 in our analyses with up to 80% of the variation explained. Bureaucratic 
quality does play an important role in this, as does economic capacity, but due to their high 
correlation, it is impossible to disentangle the effects. Economic equality also shows a significant 
positive effect on Internet access and both regime type indicators matter. All the other variables 
do not show robust effects. Thus, it appears that the proportion of the population with Internet 
access is fairly well explained by bureaucratic quality, wealth, economic equality and regime 
type. 
4.6 Environmental Governance Outcomes
Our last governance sector is environmental governance. We examined two environmental 
outcomes related to air quality. The first indicator, particulate matter 10 (pm10) is an objective 
measure of outdoor air pollution. This measure represents the average annual exposure level 
of the average urban resident to finely suspended particulate matter less than 10 microns in 
diameter. Particulates this small can penetrate deeply in the respiratory tract, with the potential 
to cause serious health damage, including respiratory illnesses and cardiopulmonary diseases 
(Pandey et al. 2006). Since particulate exposure levels are sensitive to local environmental 
regulations and pollution controls, we consider it to be a proxy for environmental governance 
outcomes.
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Our second indicator is the average satisfaction with air quality, a subjective measure defined by 
the percentage of respondents who stated that they were satisfied with their city’s or region’s air 
quality. The original data come from the Gallup World Poll, but were collected from the 2011 
HDI. 
Table 8: Multivariate regression results for environmental governance outcomes 
VARIABLES
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
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Observations 79 79 91 78 78 86
R-squared 0.325 0.299 0.297 0.474 0.467 0.258
Adj. R-squared 0.215 0.195 0.209 0.387 0.388 0.159
Robust t-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
In general, our regression analysis performs poorly at explaining variation in environmental 
governance. Our models predict less than 20% of the variation in outdoor air pollution, and up 
to 40% of the variation in satisfaction with air quality. The poor fit is likely due to inadequate 
model specification for the dependent variables. Several important factors that might be unique 
to predicting air quality were excluded from the model. We also lack reasonable indicators 
that capture the composition and size of economic activity and the degree of dependence on 
relevant energy sources, both of which affect air pollution levels. 
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Yet, the state-side variables that one might expect to affect air quality – the bureaucratic and 
enforcement capability variables – never reach statistical significance in our models. We find this 
result puzzling because the ability to pass and enforce pollution regulations should in theory 
strongly predict resulting air quality; yet we find no consistent evidence of this relationship for 
either of our dependent variables.
We do find some evidence that increased representation is associated with higher rates of 
satisfaction with air quality, but not for objective air pollution. This disconnection between 
objective and subjective notions of quality is now familiar. Democratic participation does not 
appear to make any difference in the objective degree of air pollution, but it is strongly associated 
with perceptions about air quality. The likely explanation is that the two variables measure two 
different types of air pollution. PM10 are tiny enough to enter the respiratory tract, and are 
therefore tiny enough to escape notice until they have caused health problems. On the other 
hand, satisfaction with air quality likely captures noticeable air pollution, such as smog in Mexico 
City or Beijing. Increased political representation and competitiveness may secure policies that 
objectively reduce noticeable air pollution, leading to higher rates of satisfaction, but may do 
little to reduce the more difficult and complex problem of reducing very fine particulates. It 
is worth pointing out that the only time one of our statehood measures reaches significance 
is with the subjective dependent variable. Because the coefficient’s statistical significance is 
not stable, we hesitate to put much weight on this result, but it may signal that administrative 
capacity indirectly improves satisfaction with air quality through policies and regulations that 
reduce some of the most noticeable types of air pollution.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we have analyzed worldwide governance outcomes in security, economic 
subsistence, education, health, infrastructure, and the environment at the state-level. Using 
available macro-quantitative datasets, we have tried to explain these governance outcomes with 
a model that comprises eleven independent variables arranged in what we have called six causal 
pathways: statehood, economic capacity and equality, regime type, external governance support, 
gender equality, and natural geographic and social conditions. We have first presented results 
on aggregate governance and then analyzed the breakdown by governance dimensions. Looking 
across all the analyses, and evaluating the performance of our model and its variables, a few 
conclusions stand out.
First, our model has performed fairly well in explaining governance outcomes. For all issue 
areas, except environment and security, the goodness of fit was 60% or higher.
However, statehood has played a relatively minor role in these explanations. In some cases, 
enforcement capabilities played a role, while in other cases bureaucratic quality mattered; 
but with the exception of Internet access (in the infrastructure dimension), these effects were 
not particularly strong. However, our statehood indicators did show robust and significant 
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results for all of the subjective indicators for outcomes in the different governance dimensions 
(wherever available). This suggests that statehood influences the perception of governance outcomes 
stronger than the actual outcomes themselves.
Given the prima facie plausibility of the corresponding hypothesis, it comes as no surprise 
that economic capacity does play an important role in a number of governance dimensions. 
More surprising is the important role of economic inequality, which turned out to be a strong 
predictor of governance performance across four out of six dimensions (security, health, 
education, and infrastructure). 
The regime type variables played a surprisingly small role despite the literature that concludes 
otherwise. Neither accountability nor representation structures seem to influence governance 
outcomes across the board. These indicators are, however, relevant for education, health and 
infrastructure – at least in some specifications. 
Foreign aid did play a role in economic subsistence, health and education, but the sign of 
the coefficients consistently point into the ‘wrong’ direction, indicating negative effects on 
the respective governance outcomes. This can either be interpreted as a result of insufficient 
control of endogeneity on our part (despite the 10-year lag) or it would support the arguments 
critical of aid effectiveness. For the subjective perception of governance, however, foreign aid 
played the expected role in a number of cases.
Rather impressive is the performance of our measure of female empowerment. It showed across 
the board highly significant and strong effects in most of the governance dimensions. This 
clearly supports the policy perspective on the key role the women play in development strategy.
In conclusion we can say that while statehood might influence the perception of governance 
performance, the actual performance is not as decisive for the provision of collective goods as 
the theoretical and policy literatures would lead us to believe. Rather governance outcomes 
seem to be strongly influenced by equality – be it as economic equality or, in particular, as 
gender equality. 
The combined weight of these findings suggest that variation in the state’s MoF, its administrative 
capacity, and its ability to enforce rules and regulations are not strong predictors of the variation 
in the provision of collective goods and services across a diverse number of issue areas. We do 
not wish to imply that the state does not matter. Rather, we cannot discern much of an effect of 
statehood given the measures we have and the cross-national approach we take in this analysis. 
Further qualitative research, in particular on a sub-national level of analysis, is necessary 
to contribute to the clarification of this observation. If not the state, then what explains the 
remaining variation we observe in our dependent variables? With the exception of foreign aid, 
our models do not account for one potentially key determinant of the provision of collective 
goods, and that is the role of external actors. 
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